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THE FORUM, CARLISLE, PA.
LECTURE BY HON. WALTER GEORGE
SMITH.
One of the most entertaining and inter-
esting lectures it has been the pleasure of
the Law School and people of Carlisle to
hear, was that delivered on Friday eve-
ning, March 10, by Walter George Smith,
Esq., a prominent member of the Phila-
delphia bar, who chose as his subject for
the lecture, "Roger Brooke Taney." MT
Smith is one of the most eminent grAd-
uates of the - University of Pennsyl-
vania, and one of the most scholarly law-
yers in the city. He is a trustee of the
university of which he is an alumnus.
On the retirement of the late Dr. Win.
Pepper from the provostship of the uni-
versity, Mr. Smith and Mr. Harrison were
most seriously canvassed as suitable suc-
cessors, the name of Mr. Smith being the
only one mentioned in connection with Dr.
Harrison for the position.
The speaker began his remarks with the
statement, that we have had but seven
Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Jay, Ellsworth, Mar-
shall, Taney, Chase, Waite and Fuller,
but all these but two, acquired their great-
ness and were known before they assumed
positions on the bench. They were men
great in the history of their country, aid-
ing in the making and shaping of its gov-
ernment, and the moulding of its future
welfare. But Marshall and Taney achiev-
ed their greatness by service upon the
bench. Marshall will always be known
as the creator of constitutional law. Taney,
his successor, continued his work in the
constitutional law realm, moulding and
forming it as it exists to-day.
Mr. Smith then gave a short resum6 of
the early years of the future Chief Justice.
Asa lad of fifteen Mr. Taney came to Car-
lisle in 1792, to attend Dickinson College.
Remaining three years he was valedic-
torian of his class, in 1795, the commence-
ment exercises being held in the Presbyte-
rian church, on Oct. 7. During his course, he
was home but twice, and on each of these
occasions, walked The whole distance of
eighty-five miles from Carlisle to Balti-
more.
After graduation, Mr. Taney entered the
office of Judge Chase in Baltimore and
studied closely and attentively for three
years. He himself says, he spent twelve
out of the tWenty-four hours in the day, in
studious toil, though he afterwards said
he would have profited better by less btudy
and more thought.
He was a close student of pleading. The
speaker considered it a matter of great re-
gret, that so small attention is paid now to
the science of pleading. Thatmuch of the
beauty and interesting points in the law
have been obliterated by the laxity with
which forms ofpleading are to-daypursued.
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In 1798, Mr. Taney was admitted to the
bar. Shortly after this, he was elected to
the General Assembly of Maryland. In
1801 he entered the practice of the law in
Frederick, Md., and was at the bar five
years, before meeting with any pecuniary
success. Ift 1816 was elected to the State
Senate.
His first great success as a lawyer, and
one which brought him into prominence,
was his defence of a methodist preacher
from Pennsylvania, who had been charged
with inciting slaves to rebellion. In the
trial of this case, he expressed the senti-
ment, that "A hard necessity imposes
slavery upon us. It was handed to us from
another state, it is a great evil, and we
must use our best endeavors to become rid
of it."
Taney relied on the-strength of his argu-
ments, the sincerity of his manner, and
the convincing weight of his proof for his
success. He spoke firmly, and in strong
argumentative fashion.
He did not stoop to sharp practice and
petty means to gain a case, but was gen-
erous and courteous to all his opponents.
In 1823, Mr. Taney removed to Balti-
nore and in 1827, upon the unanimous
recommendation of the Baltimore Bar, was
appointed Attorney General of Maryland.
In June 1&l, President Jackson ap-
pointed him to the position of Attorney
General of the United Siates. Taney was
strongly opposed to the then existing
Bank of the United States, and supported
the policy of withdrawing the funds of the
United States Treasury from its possession.
As this was Jackson's pet scheme, Taney
was appointed Secretary of the Treasury
by Jackson, to take the place of the secre-
tary who was removed for this purpose.
After the appointment was made, and
Taney entered upon the dutiesof the office,
he withdrew all the United States Treas-
ury funds from the bank. He justified
his action on the ground that the bank
was a great money corporation; that its
power and strength in wielding a corrupt
political influence was enormous; that it
was already beginning to exert an evil in-
fluence upon the politics of the nation,
and that it was for the welfare of the nation
that this great monied and corrupt institu-
tion should be deprived of its power.
The Senate failing to confirm his appoint-
ment to the Treasury department, Taney
resigned, and resumed his practice in Bal-
timore. In 1835, he. was nominated for
the position of Supreme Court Justice, to
succeed Chief Justice Marshall, who had
suggested him to be his successor. Mr.
Taney entered upon the duties of this of-
fice, and ably performed them for twenty-
six years, winning for himself a reputa-
tion parallel with that of Chief Justice
Marshall.
His opinions are distinguished for their
clearness, fullness, and comprehensive
grasp of the subjects of litigation, be-
fore him. Said the speaker, "his de-
cisions are so perspicuous, that each is
worthy of a separate consideration." Mr.
Smith here entered into a discussion of the
Dred Scott decision rendered by Chief
Justice Taney, and also commented upon
various other decisions rendered by the
famous and venerable Chief Justice.
Mr. Taney died October 12, 1864, having
lived a useful life in the full and conscien-
tious performance of duty toward his fel-
lowmen.
Mr. Smith is an able and pleasant speak-
er and closely holds the attention of the
audience during the whole course of his lec-
ture. The remarks he made on this occasion
were entertaining to the highest degree,
and a cordial invitation is extended to
him to repeat his visit to Carlisle, and to
favor us with a second address, at his
earliest opportunity.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Alfred J. Feight has been elected presi-
dent of the town council of New Cumber-
land.
Neil C. McEwen, '93, of Kane, has dis-
solved partnership with Mr. W. L. Calkins,
and will hereafter engage in the practice
alone.
Brown, '97, has purchased a full set of
Pennsylvania reports. He writes that he
will attend commencement. Williams and
Snyder will also come with him.
John M. Wilson, of the class of '94, is
succeeding nicely in Williamsport. His
office is 32 West High street.
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Robert Eldon, '96, who has beet teach-
ing in the High School at Lock Haven,
since graduating, will enter the bar in that
city this fall.
THE SCHOOL.
A very enthusiastic reception was ten-
dered to the members of Company G, 8th
regiment, popularly knovn as the "Gobin
Guards," upon their return, on Thursday,
March 9, from almost a year's experience
as volunteers in Uncle Sam's victorious
army. When this company left Carlisle
last April, it took with 'it eight or. ten
of the members of the law school. These-
men all served their time worthily and
received honorable discharges during the
fall, all except one, Miles Murr, who re-
mained with the company, returning with
it on the occasion of this reception. When
the "boys" left Carlisle, none extended- a
more enthusiastic send off, than did the
law school, and when the "marching
home" time came, none extended a more
hearty welcome than did the men in the
law department. Elaborate arrangements
were made, and carried out, in the rece -
tion of the company, among which was
the grand street parade and fire-works
display of the evening. In this parade,
the law school turned out en masse. The
classes were divided and formed into sepa-
rate companies, each with marshals ap-
pointed from its own ranks, the whole
body being officered by a marshal, chosen
from the Senior Class. Samuel B. Hare,
of the Senior Class, was Chief Marshal.
Taylor, Stevens and John, were chosen by
the Middle Class to keep them in proper
rank and position, while Rothermal, Wal-
lace and Henderson looked after the Jun-
ior class.
Hon. Fillmore Maust, a prominent
member of the Cumberland County bar,
and of the State Legislature, very kindly
presented a copy of Smull's Legislative
HandLook, to the law library. Many
thanks are extended to Mr. Maust for his
courtesy.
A large number of the middle class have
handed in their names as competitors for
the prize offered by the Dean for the best
series of Moot Court briefs.
The members of the graduating class are
hard at work on their theses.
Delta Chi Fraternity held a smoker in
their rooms Friday evening, Feb. 24. The
invited -guests were Hon. Edw. Biddle,
Judge Ninth Judicisl District, Hon. J. M.
Weakley, J. W. Wetzel, Esq., H. Silas
Stuart, Esq., C. C. Basehore, Esq.,
Frederick C. Woodward, Esq., Caleb S.
Brinton, Esq., Jerry S. Omwake, Esq., J.
C. Kissel, Esq., A. J. Feight, Esq.
At a recent meeting of the Allison So-
ciety it was unanimously decided to amend
the constitution of the society, so as to re-
duce the term of office from a three
month's term to one of six weeks. This
step had been under consideration for some
time, and it was finally concluded that
the change would be for the best interests
of the society. After the adoption of the
amendment, the society elected the follow-
ing new officers to serve for the ensuing
term: 'President, Eugene D. Siegrist:
Vice-president, W. Alfred Valentine; Sec-
retary, Warren L. Shipman; Treasurer,
Wilson S. Rothermal.
Messrs. Freed, Alexander and Lightner
were chosen as members of the Executive
Committee. Messrs. 'cCabe, Johnston
and Piper were elected to active member-
ship in the Society.
At the next meeting of the Society, a
debate will be had on the question, "Re-
solved that there should bean educational
qualification for suffrage."
The thanks of the Law School are most
cordially extended to Major Pratt for the
courtesies he has shown to the men during
the Indian School Commencement. These
exercises are always of great interest, and
have in the past attracted such immense
crowds that the Major has been compelled
to exclude all persons not having tickets.
The law men were enabled to attend all
the exercises, through Major Pratt's kind-
ness in supplying each man with the
ticket of admission.
The college basket ball team, four out of
the five comprising the team being. law
men, won a hotly contested game in the
gymnasium, on March 4th.
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The Seniors have finished their course
in Patents, and are now studying the re-
cent National Bankrupt Law.
Reese was called home during the month
by the illness of two of his children. We
are glad to report that they have fully re-
covered.
Chas. Meyer made a flying trip to Bal-
timore recently.
There will be a distinct law department
in the Microcosm this year. Every stu-
dent should purchase one of these corn-
pendiums of college fun and jokes.
The Juniors have finished Torts and are
now taking Domestic Relations, in its
place.
The following persons have been ap-
pointed to represent the Law School upon
the Microcosm Board: Isaiah Sheeline,
(Chief,) B. Johnston MacEwen, Eugehie
D. Seigrist, George Aubrey, George L.
Schuyler.
At a meeting of the school held Monday,
March 13, a unanimous vote of thanks was
passed, expressing to Hon. Walter George
Smith, the appreciation of the Law school,
of his excellent lecture delivered on Friday
evening preceding, and extending an in-
vitation to repeat his 7isit to Carlisle.
MOOT COURT.
TRUMBULL vs. TRUMBULL.
Contract for separation- Right of wife to
maintain action against husband-Es..
toplpel by judgment of Justice of the
Peace.
Assumpsit.
RILEY and MCCABE for plaintiff.
1. Agreement by husband and wife to
separate, and husband to support her is
valid, and she can sue for amount of con-
tract.-Hutton v. Hutton, 3 Pa. 104; Hit-
ner's Appeal, 64 Pa. 110; A. & E. Ency. of
Law, Vol. 22, p. 1839.
2.. Claim being over $100, Justice of the
Peace has only concurrent jurisdiction.-
Borland v. Early, 43 Pa. 11], Act of April
15, 1845.
KATZ and FRANK for defendant.
1. If the case is an appeal, the Court of
Common Pleas has no jurisdiction as the
Justice of the Peace decided in a case of
over $100 which is not of his jurisdiction.
Thomas v. Pyle, 2 Pa. Co. Court, 2.58; Col-
lins v. Collins, 37 Pa. 387.
2. By Act of June 8, 1893, wife sepa-
rated from husband can only maintain
suit against husband in divorce action or
to recover her separate property in his
hands.
3. A judgment in a prior suit is an ab-
solute estoppel to a subsequent action.-
Cromwell v. County, 94 U. S. 351.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
In May, 1896, Susan and William Trum-
bull, who were lawfully wedded, agreed to
separate. William executed a written
agreement to his wife Susan, agreeing to
pay her $50 per month for her suppoit,
with the understanding that they should
live apart.
In January, 1897, the monthly allow-
ance not having been paid for three
months the plaintiff brought an action be-
fore the Justice of the Peace for the
amount due, claiming by reason of the
written agreement.
On the day of the hearing she was un-
able to produce the agreement, claiming
she could not find it; The Justice, there-
fore, entered a judgment for the defendant.
An action is brought before the Court of
Common Pleas to recover amount due on
agreement.
The defendant claims the plaintiff can-
not maintain an action against her hus-
band, and further that if she could, she is
estopped by the judgment of the Justice.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The soundness of the agreement between
the husband and wife for the payment to
her, monthly, of $50, as a consideration
for a separation, has not been contested.
Scotts' Estate, 147 Pa. 102; Com. v. Rich-
ards, 131 Pa. 209. If the husband pays to
the wife, what he has agreed to pay, she
cannot compell him to pay her more.
Com. v. Richards. Susan Trumbull is af-
firming the validity of the agreement, by
bringing an action upon it. As to the de-
fendant, William Trumbull, it is binding.
Three monthly payments having fallen
in arrear, Susan brought an action for them
before a Justice of the Peace, who entered a
judgment for the defendant. Thereupon,
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this action for the same money was com-
menced in the Common Pleas. The judg-
ment of any court, even a Justice's, if on
the merits is a bar to a second action for
the same cause, between the same parties.
Springer v. Wood, 18 W. N. C. 520. Al-
though the plaintiff may, at any stage of
the trial, suffer a non-suit, and thus pre-
serve his right to bring a second action,
Springer v. Wood; Blair v. McLean, 25
Pa. 77, a judgment rendered for the de-
fendant, because of the inability or un-
willingness of the plaintiff to tender the
necessary evidence, is not a non-suit.
Susan Trumbull was, on the day of the
trial before the Justice, "unable to produce
the agreement," not having found it, but
the judgment ensuing in favor of the de-
fendant, was just as conclusive, as if all
the evidence she 'was then, or has since be-
come, possessed of, had been submitted.
Interest rei publicae, ut sit finis lititm.
Suits might be innumerable, if a party,
because when a trial is had, he cannot
command the evidence, could bring other
suits for the same cause. Cf. Moorehouse
v. Ufoorehouse, 7 Superior 287.
The action is by a wife against a hus-
band, on a contract. At common law,
she could not sue him. Her ability to sue,
if she has such, is granted by the 3rd sec-
tion of the Act of June 8th, 1893; 2 P. &
L. 2905; which, after saying that a mar-
ried woman may "sue and be sued civilly,"
adds, "but she may not sue her husband,
except (]) in proceeding for divorce, or (2)
in a proceeding to protect or recover her
separate property, whensoever (a) he may
have deserted or separated ltimself from
her without sufficient cause, or (b) may
have neglected or refused to support her."
Under similar circumstances, and for sini-
ilar causes, the husband is authorized by
the act, to sue her. It is seriously doubtful,
we think, whether the legislature intended
by the "separate property" for which hus-
band or wife could sue the wife or hus-
band, contracts made between them, al-
though one of the appellate courts has
concluded that it did so intend; Moore-
house v. Mloorehouse, 7 Superior 287.
But, even if such was its intention, suits
for any "separate property" are permitted
to spouse against spouse, only whenever
there has been a desertion or separation
without sufficient cause, or a neglect or
refusal of the husband to support the wife.
It has indeed been made to appear that
there has been a separation; but for what
cause? Sufficient or insufficient? Did
William Trumbull furnish the cause, or
did Susan? Information on this indis-
pensable point, has not been produced.
Nor does it appear that William Trum-
bull has neglected or refused to support his
wife. The conditions are not shown to
exist, for the bringing of an action.
We are compelled therefore, gentlemen
of the jury, to instruct you that, for the
reason stated, your verdict should be for
the defendant.
HULL vs. LYNAM.
Lease on condition-Breach- Offer of new
lease-D&tres.s-Act Qf 1772.
Trespass.
MAIRIIN WOLF and WALTER L. Houcs
for the plaintiff.
1. The mere occupation of premises
without agreement to pay a liquidated
sum as rent does not give the landlord the
right of distress. Rent must be fixed and
certain or at least capable of ascertainment
by calculation. Farrington v. Bailey, 21
Wend. 6-5; Wells v. Hornish, 3 P. & W. 30;
McGee v. Fessler, 1 Pa. 126.
2. The mere breach of a covenant in a
lease will not work a forfeiture unless the
right of re-entry is reserved, or it expressly
provides for termination of lease without
re-entry clause. Tiedman on Real Prop.
158; Delancy v. Ganog, 9 N. Y. 9; Pale-
throp v. Bergner, 52 Pa. 149.
3. Rent not being certain, no right of
distress existed, and under the Act of
March 21, 1772, this action can be main-
tained by the plaintiff.
WILLIAM A. JORDAN and HERMAN M.
SYPHERD for the defendant.
1. A lease may provide for termination
upon breach ofa condition subsequentwith-
out a clause of re-entry, and in such case
it will terminate at that time. Sheaffer v.
Sheaffer, 37 Pa. 525; Kenrick v. Smith, 7
W. & S. 41; Parmalee v. Oswego R. Co.,
6 N. Y. 74.1 2. The defendant had the right of dis-
tress by virtue of the Actof March 21, 1772,
P. & L. 2635.
3. The distress was made under the
lease impliedly accepted by Hull.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thomas I. Lynam leased a certain
house in Altoona to H. H. Grabill and
wife, on the 29th of July, 1898, for one
month, at $15 rental, with the understand-
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ing that at the end of the month the lease
should continue from month to month, if
the parties so desired, until legal notice
was given to terminate the relation of
landlord and tenant. Under the terms of
the lease, neither party was to use the
premises for any purpose other than that
stated in the lease.
Mr. and Mrs. Grabill occupied said house
until the 34th day of September following,
as a dwelling house. Mr. Grabill and one
C. A. Hull, wished to enter into a partner-
ship to conduct a meat market. They
found that the front room in the house
which Mr. Grabill had lea-6d of Mr. Ly-
nam would make a suitable meat market,
so on the 14th day of September they leased
said room from Mr. Lynam, under the
following lease: "Article of agreement
between Thomas M. Lynam of the first
part and H. H. Grabill and Chas. A. Hull
of the second part, all of Altoona, Pa. The
party of the first part agrees to let the party
of the second part have the use ofthe front
room in dwelling house No. 212.5 Seventh
Avenue, Altoona, Pa., for the term of one
year free of rent providing that H. H.
Grabill occupies the dwelling he now has
leased, namely, 2125 Seventh Avenue, for
which he is to pay the same amount of
rent as specified in lease, said room to be
used as a butclier shop. The parties of the
second part agree to pay at the expiration
of the year the amount of ten dollars per
month for the future use of room, to be
paid at the end of each month, also not to
let room to any other party without the
consent of the party of the first part which
shall be in writing."
Mr. Hull and Mr. Grabill accordingly
fitted up said front room as required by the
lease and occupied it as a butcher shop un-
til the 14th day of October following, when
they dissolved partnership, and on the
18th dayof October Mr. Grabill moved out of
the dwelling portion of the house, Mr.
Hull still occupying the room used as a
butcher shop. On the 22d day of October,
Mr. Lynam leased the dwelling portion of
the house to a third party at the rental of
$12 per month. On the 24th day of Octo-
ber Mr. Lynam rerved a written notice upon
Mr. Hull that if he continued in the pos-
session of the room which was used as
butcher shop, he would charge him $10
per month rent. On the 26th day of
November, Mr. Lynam levied upon all of
the goods and chattels of Mr. Hull, which
were in said room, for $10 rent which he
claimed was due from the 24th day of
October to the 24th day of November.
Said goods were regularly appraised and
sold oil the 9th day, of December, for about
$6. The goods were actually worth 4bout
$125.
Mr. Hull at once brought suit, under the
Act of 1772, for double the value of the
goods sold when no rent was in arrear,
against the constable, Thos. M. Lynam,
Jr., who levied upon and sold the goods.
Mr. Hull did not agree after Mr. Grabill
moved out to pay any rent. He claimed
to have a right to occupy the butcher shop
under the former lease.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The claim of the plaintiff that he had
the right, after the removal of Grabill, to
continue in possession of the front room of
the dwelling under the agreement of Sept.
14,1898, was entirely without foundation.
The privilege of Grabill and Hull to use
the room as a butcher shop for one year,
was upon the express condition that Gra-
bill should continue during the year to oc-
cupy the dwelling. And the provision in
the agreement for the payment of ten dol-
lars per month after the expiration of the
year was without doubt inserted in con-
templation of the same condition. It
clearly follows, then, that the removal of
Grabill ipso facto terminated the privilege
of both Grabill and Hull to occupy the
front room of the dwelling. Sheaffer v.
Sheaffer, 37 Pa. 525; Kenrick v. Smith, 7
W. & S. 47.
The arrangement with Grabill and Hull
having terminated, Lynam, of course, was
at liberty to make a new lease of the prem-
ises upon any terms that might be agreed
upon. Accordingly, lbe duly notified Hull
that he might have the room for ten dQ1-
lars per month. Hull, it appears, did not
accept this offer, but continued in posses-
sion until the distraint, claiming that he
had the right so to do under the lease to
Grabill and Hull, of September 14. It
does not appear whether or not Hull's
claim was communicated to Lynam, This
is unfortunate, for we apprehend that that
question is the pivot upon which the
case turns. If we assume that in reply to
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Lynam's notice, Hull with reasonable
promptness informed Lynam that-he be-
lieved himself to be entitled to the posses-
sion under the agreement of September'14,
and that consequently he would not agree
to pay the rent demanded, it cannot be
contended that Hull thereafter held the
premises under a lease by which he was
bound to pay a rent of ten dollars per
month. Not only is there an absence of
assent on the part of thelesseeto the terms
of the lessor's offer, but there is an express
and positive dissent. Under such circum-
stances Lynam might have an action
against Hull for use and occupation, but
not the right of distress. It is essential to
the exercise of the right of distress that
there be an actual demise of the premises
for a rent certain. As Mr. Justice Wil-
liams, in Hessel v. Johnson, 142 Pa. 8,
9ays: "From the earliest days of the com-
mon law, it has been regarded as a remedy
for the non-payment of rent to be made
n1sb of by the landlord or his bailift because
of a demise at a rent certain of the prem-
ises entered for the purpose of making the
seizure. * * The avowry of the seizure
must, therefore, on all the authorities,
English or American, set out a demise, the
rent reserved; thatrentwas in arrears under
the demise; and that the seizure was made
to compel the payment of such arrears."
See also Wells v. Hornish, 3 P. A W. 30;
Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd Ed.),
Vol. 9, p. 620-622, and numerous cases
there cited.
If the facts were as we have assumed, the
plaintiff would be entitled to judgment for
double the value of the goods sold by the
constable, in accordance w ith the provi-
sions of the Act of 1772.
However, in the absence of any evidence
that Hull's position, was duly communi-
cated to Lynam, we cannot assume such
to be the fact. It thus-appears that Hull,
while entertaining the belief that b- was
not bound to pay rent, did not actually re-
ject the offer made to him by Lynam, but,
on the contrary, by continuing in posses-
sion of the premises, gave to such offer an
implied assent. It follows that he there-
after held the :prervises under an actual
demise from Lynam by the terms of which
.he was bound to pay a rent certain, i. e.
ten dollars per month. Thus, all of the
requisites to the exercise of the right of
distress were present, and this action un-
der the Act of 1772 cannot be maintained.
Judgment for defendant.
GOODELL vs. THE CAMDEN, ETC.,
R. R. CO.
Interpretation of terms ofpass-book-Com-
pany makes a change in dihnsions-Pas-
senger ejected.
Non-suit.
F. C. MILLER and EUGENE D. SIEGRIST
for the plaintiff.
1. The court will construe words most
strongly against the party who used them.
Clark on Contracts 593.
2. The ticket is not the contract. It is
only evidence of the contract, and a re-
ceipt for fare. Not being the contract, its
terms may be varied by parol evidence.-
Rawson v. R. R. Co., 48N. Y. 212.
3. By all the authorities the company
has the right to make reasonable stipula-
tions.-Smith v. Phila. R. Co., 1t Pa., C.
C. R: 355; Way v. Chicago R. Co., 64
Iowa 48; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Chapman,
146 Mass. 117.
GARRETT STEVENS and RORERT H.
SmITH for the defendant.
1. Goodell was bound by the terms of
his contract to give up one ticket or coupon
'or each division marked or designated on
the back of his commutation ticket.-Rip-
ley v. N. J. Ry. and T. Co., 31 N. J. L.
388; Bennett v. Ry. Co , 7 Phila. 11; Wells
v. N. Y. C. Ry. Co., 24 N. Y. 181.
2. The conductor was justified in eject-
ing Goodell from the car when he (Good-
eli) refused either to permit the conductor
to detach the necessary number of coupons
or to pay his fare in cash.-Am. and Eng.
Enc., 25 Vol. 1X)89; Am. R, R. Cases, 16 Vol.
574; Townsend v. N. Y. C. Ry. Co., 56 N.
Y. 296.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant corporation owns and
operates a street railway, connecting Cam-
den, Gloucester and Woodbury. R. H.
Goodell purchased a pass book on the de-
fendant's road subject to the following con-
ditions, viz. In consideration of the re-
duced rates at which this ticket is sold I
agree that its use shall be subject to the fol-
lowing.
1. That it will be forfeited if presented
by any other person than myself.
2 That it is good for passage until usecd.
3. That itconveys no privileges totrans-
port goods or express matter.
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4. That the purchaser has no claim for
rebate on account of non-use of coupons for
any cause.
5. That the holdershall permit tie con-
ductor to detach one coupon on any divi-
sion as set forth on cover.
Signed R. H. GOODELL.
Divisions as set forth on cover are No. 1,
Keighn Ave. to Gloucester. No. 2, Between
Gloucester and Washington Park. No. 3,
Between Washington Park and Voodbury.
On Sept. 1st, 1898, the defendant corpo-
ration changed the divisions on their road
making two instead of three, viz., Between
Keighn Ave. and Gloucester and between
Gloucester and Woodbury, but still de-
inanded of plaintiff three .coupons as set
forth in his book. Plaintiff refused to al-
low the conductor to detach but two cou-
pons and was thereupon by the conductor
on Sept. 10th, 1898, forcibly ejected from
one of the defendant's cars, wherefore he
brings this suit to recover five thousand
dollars damages.
DECISION OF THE COURT.
Goodell purchased a pass-book from the
railway company. This book contained
coupons which were detachable. The road
was divided into three divisions, number-
ed 1, 2, and 3. One of the printed condi-
tions of the contract was, that the holder
(Goodell) should permit the conductor to
detach one coupon on any division as set
forth on cover. The cover set forth the
three divisions, defining the 1st as that
part of the route between Keighn Avenue
and Gloucester; the 2nd as the part be-
tween Gloucester and Washington Park,
and the 3rd, as the part between Washing-
ton Park and Woodbury. It was the in-
tention of the parties, that when any part
of any one of these divisions was traveled
over, the passenger should sacrifice one
coupon. To the enforcement of such stip-
ulations there can be no objection. Cf.
Ripley v. N. J. Passenger R. R., 31 N. J.
L. 388; Bennett v. R. R. Co., 7 Phila. 11.
The only important question is one of in-
terpretation. The pass-book defined the
divisions. Are we to understand the
parties to have meant that a travel within
any division, as thus defined, or within
any division as defined by any later act
of the company should oblige the surren-
render of one coupon?
The divisions are made by the company
without consulting passengers. It is diffi-
cult to think that the passenger intended
to give the company the power to lessen
the value of his coupons, by shortening
and multiplying the divisions. Had the
company, instead of reducing the number
from three to two, increased it from three
to six, and insisted on cancelling a coupon
on travel within each of the six, the pas-
senger, doubtless, would have discovered
that he had not intended that the value of
his coupon should be changeable at
the will of the company. Evidently,
the parties meant by their language, that
one coupon should be sacrificed, for any
travel between Keighn Avenue and Glou-
cester, another, for any travel between
Gloucester and Washington Park, etc.
These distances were then known as Di-
vision I and Division 2, but it was the dis-
tance, not the division, the travel within
which was intended to regulate the re-
sumption of the coupon.
For reasons satisfactory to itself, the com-
pany might change the number and
length of the divisions, and for the future,
pass-books might be issued with a view to
the new subdivision. It could not be in-
ferred from such act of the company. that
it intended to change the value of pass-
books already issued. Indeed, had it so
intended, it could not be bound by such
act. It would be granting, without con-
sideration, a larger right of travel than
the contract specified, if the divisions were
lessened in number, and would be with-
drawing from the passenger a part of the
right secured by the contract, if the di-
visions were multiplied.
We do not intimate that, if the parties
had contracted that a coupon should be
taken up for all travel within any division
existing, or to be created in the future,
this contract would not be enforceable. We
do not find that such was their purpose.
The right reserved by the company was to
"detach one coupon on any division as set
forth on cover." A contract conferring
on it the right to detach one coupon for
any division the company might at any
time make, would have been so imprudent
and unreasonable that the intention to
make it cannot be imputed to the plaintiff.
On Sept. 10th, 1898, Goodell, while go-
ing from Camden to Woudbury, passed
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through the first two divisions, as defined
on the pass-book, and permitted the con-
ductor to take up, in each, a coupon. After
he had entered into the third division, the
conductor demanded a third coupon. Oil
Goodell's refusal to let him take it, Good-
ell was "forcibly ejected" from the car.
The right of a railroad company to eject
a passenger who refuses to pay his fare, or
do the equivalent thereof, is too well set-
tled to need vindication by authority. We
are not advised that more force was used
in the ejection of Goodell, than was nec-
essary; or that he was ejected at an hi-
proper place, or that he suffered any in-
jury from being thrust out. The non-suit
was therefore properly allowed.
MILLARD SPANGLER vs. ALFRED
JONES and ROBERT SHORT.
Liability ofparties to a deed in trust-Lia-
bility of trustee.
LIGHTNER and YEAGER for plaintiff.
A trustee is personally liable for contracts
made in behalf of the trust estate. Fehlin-
gerv. Wood, 134 Pa. 517; Mason v. Pome-
roy, 151 Mass. 164.
The trustee was acting as vin agent and
bound other members of trust estate.
COLLINS and CLARK for defendant.
Short was not a party to the contract and
was not bound. Not a case of principal
and agent.
Trustee who makes contracts under au-
thority of parties to the trust. is not person-
ally bound. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige (N.
Y.) 9; Morris's Estate, 20 W. N. C. 30;
Glenn v. Allison, 58 Md. 527.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Alfred Jones and Robert Short were cred-
itors of Allen Warren in 1895, who at that
time was keeping a grocery. His business
becoming involved, he agreed with his
creditors Jones and Short to enter into a
deed of trust in which the creditors men-
tioned joined, by which the business was
transferred to the trustee, who should con-
tinue the same and account for the profits.
Alfred Jones, one of the defendants, was
appointed trustee. He continued to man-
age the business for three months, purchas-
ing goods, etc. Losses resulted, instead of
profits, and at the expiration of the time
mentioned business was suspended. The
plaintiff in this case, Millard Spangler, had
sold $300 worth of goods to the trustee of
the concern, Alfred Jones. The bill not be-
ing paid, he brings this action against Jones
and Short individually.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The two parties defendant do not stand
in the same relation to the plaintiff. It is
true that both are creditors of Warren and
therefore benbficiaries under the trust deed,
but the defendant Jones is also the trustee
under that instrument. It is contended
by plaintiff that both of the defendants
are liable, for the reason that the trust
deed really operated to transfer the busi-
ness to them; that they afterwards sustain-
ed to the business the relation of proprietors;
and that Jones, in purchasing goods from
the plaintiff acted for the firm. We are
convinced that such was not the effect of
the instrument. If Warren had made an
outright sale of the business to Jones and
Short, in satisfaction of their claims
against him, and the management of the
business had then been entrusted to Jones,
the position of the plaintiff could not be
successfully attacked. In that case Jones
and Short would have been entitled to all
the profits of the business and Warren
would have had no interest whatever.
But in the case actually before us, the ar-
rangement was simply one for the pay-
ment of Warren's debts. Warren contin-
ued to be the person primarily interested
in the profits of the business. In reality,
every cent of profit belonged to Warren.
Of course, under the terms of the trust deed,
he was to turn over to Jones and Short so.
much of the profits as would satisfy their
debts, but of the funds so paid over he was
to securer the full benefit, and after the dis-
charge of his obligations, all remaining
and subsequent profits were tQ remain in
his hands. In short, the defendants, after
the execution of the deed, occupied the
position, not of proprietors, but of credi-
tors-with better security for the collec-
tion of their claims than they previously
enjoyed, perhaps, but still only creditors.
If, then, the position of Short was not
naturally affected by the trust deed, why
did he sign it? While we cannot assert
positively what his intention was, it is
hardly credible that he meant to incur a
personal liability for all the debts that
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might be contracted b& the trustee in the
operation of the business. It seems very
probable, on the other hand, that his signa-
ture was obtained merely as a consent to
the arrangement, so that he might not
subsequently attack the deed as fraudulent.
By the terms of the instrument the full
control of the business for an indefinite
period is placed in the hands of a trustee,
where it is out of the reach of creditors who
are not parties to the arrangement. In
such a state of affairs, it is not improbable
that the courts would declare the trust a
fraud upon such creditors. By securing
the signature of Short, however, all danger
of attack from him was averted.
We realize that we ought not to be gov-
erned entirely by what we apprehend to
have been in the minds of the parties in
executing the trust deed. Nevertheless,
in the absence of any controlling legal
principle, it is our duty to give to the in-
strument an effect which is fair and rea-
sonable. And in determining what is fair
and reasonable, we must have regard for
the circumstances of the case and the con-
veniences of trade.
Although transactions similar to the one
in this case are frequent, the question is,
we believe, a novel one in this jurisdiction.
The House of Lords however, in the case
of Wheatcroft v. Hickman, 9 C. B. (N. S.)
47, gave to it the most exhaustive consid-
eration, and decided that creditors joining
in the trust deed are not individually
liable. The court declares that in view of
the beneficial character of such arrange-
ments, unnecessary obstacles should not
without good reasons be thrown in the
way of those who wish to enter into them.
We fail to see how the defendant Jones
can escape responsibility. A trustee, un-
like an agent, is personally liable for goods
purchased by him in the execution of his
trust. This is a well settled and familiar
proposition. Indeed it is said that as a
general rule a creditor cannot claim any
lien on an equitable right in the trust es-
tate, but must look entirely to the trustee
and his individual property; the trustee
being entitled to reimbursements from the
funds in his hands, if the expenditure was
proper. Hewitt v. Phelps, 105 U. S. 393;
New v. Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, Peo. v. Ab-
bott, 107 N. Y. 225; Mayo v. Moritz, 151
Mass. 481; Odd Fellows Asso. v. McAllister,
153 Mass. 292.
Judgment for plaintiff against the de-
fendant Jones.
EDGAR R. VERNON v. JOSEPH A.
COMLY.
Motion for Non-suit denied-Negligence
for the jury-Copperas used as deodori-
zer-Caused the death of hogs-Damages.
Motion for compulsory non-suit.
CHAS. G. MOYER and RUBY R. VALE for
the plaintiff.
1. Ordinary care is a question for thejury, even though the facts be undisputed.
Kinney v. R. R. Co.. 80 Mo. 573; Atkin-
son v. Goodrich, 60 Wis. 141; Ohio R. R.
Co. v. Callam, 73 Ind., 261; Hoffman v.
Touburnne Co., 10 Cal. 413.
2. It is actionable negligence, if a person
in the observance of a legal duty to another,
has done or omitted to do somethinL, which
an ordinarily prudent and.carefuf person
under similar circumstances and condi-
tions would not have done or omitted, such
act or omission being the proximate cause
of injury. Needham v. R, R. Co., 85 Ky.
423; Briggs v. R. P.. Co., 148 Mass. 72;
Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 26; Kay
v. R R. Co., 65 Pa. 269; Durant v. Palmer,
29 N. J. L. 546.
JOHN G. MILLER and CHAS. H. MEYER
for the defendant.
1. Any citizen, acting either as an indi-
vidual or as public official under the orders
of local or municipal authorities, may
abate a nuisance. Manhattan Mfg., etc.,
v. Van Keuren, 23 N. J. L. 251.
2. The defendant was not a trespasser
and therefore is notliable unless his act was
negligently done. Pollock on Torts 305;
Am. and En-. Encyc., 26 Vol. 599: Selden
v. Del: and THdson Canal Co., 29 N.
642.
3. In the facts as 9tated, there is no
evidence of negligence. Buckingham v.
Plymouth Water Co., 142 Pa. 221; Bloser v.
("umb. Water Co., 3 Forum 81.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Vernon and Comly live on adjoining
farms. The Vernon farm belongs to
Vernon's wife. The Comly farm belongs to
Comly's wife. For more than twenty
years, there has been a sewer from the
Comly house to the edge of the Vernon
property emptying into a stream on
'the same. In the month of August,
1898, the odors from the outlet of this
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sewer became very offensive to the Vernon
family. Vernon notified Comly and also
the State Board of Health and asked to
have the nuisance abated. Comly, under
the advice of the Secretary of the Board
of Health, scattered a large quantity of
copperas about the mouth of the sewer
and upon the property of the Vernons.
Vernon's hogs running about this part of
the farm, got some of this copperas and
died from the effects of the poison. The
hogs are valued at $100. Defendant asks
for a compulsory non-suit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
We are of the opinion that this case
must go to the jury; Comly scattered the
copperas upon Vernon's property of his
own motion and upon his own responsi-
bility. He was not acting under the di-
rection or upon the authority of the State
Board of Health. It is true that complaint
was made to the Board, but it does not ap-
pear that the nuisance was ordered to be
abated or that any action whatever was
taken by the Board. Indeed it is but
reasonable to infer that no action was
taken. The secretary did not inform
Comly that the Board had declared that a
nuisance existed and must be abated, but
merely advised him to spread copperas
about the mouth of the sewer.
Whether or not Comly committed a tres-
pass in going upon the land of the Vernons
for the purpose of spreading the disinfec-
tant, is a question the answer to which is
not essential to the decision of this motion.
Conceding that the plaintiff by complain-
ing to the defendant of the nuisance and
requesting him to have it abated, gave him
an implied license to go upon the land and
do whatever might be necessary to effect
such an abatement, there still remains the
important question,-was the defendant
guilty of negligence in the abatement of
the nuisance?
It is urged by the learned counsel for the
defendant that there is not the slightest
evidence of negligence and that the motion
for a non-suit should therefore be granted.
We cannot take that view. The rule is
that the question of negligence should not
be taken from the jury unless the facts are
undisputed and of such a nature that but
one inference may reasonably be drawn
from them. Neslie v. Ry. Co., 113 Pa. 300;
Schum v. Rd. Co., 107 Pa. 8; Payne v.
Reese, 100 Pa. 301; Railway Co. v. Foxley,
107 Pa. 537; Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law,
Vol. 16, p. 465, and cases there cited. It
surely cannot be said that the only infer-
ence that may reasonably be drawn from
the conduct of the defendant, is that he
was entirely free from negligence. Indeed
we find our own mind to be seriously in
doubt as to whether or not the facts show
negligence. If the defendant knew the
poisonous nature of copperas, we incline to
the opinion that his conduct was negligent,
for he ought at least to have informed the
plaintiff that he had spread a poisonous
disinfectant upon his land. There is no
evidence, however, that the defendant
knew that copperas is poisonous. Does his
ignorance excuse him from the charge of
negligence? Was the advice of the. Secre-
tary of the State Board of Health a suffi-
cient guaranty of its harmlessness ? Should
he not have known the poisonous character
of such a commonly used substance?
Should he not have made inquiries, before
spreading it upon the lands of a neighbor?
These questions are not easily answered.
His conduct must be tested by thestandard
of the ordinarily prudent person acting
under like circumstances and conditions.
Kay v. Pa. Rd. Co., 65 Pa. 269; Phila., etc.
Ry. Co. v. Layer, 112 Pa. 414; Shearnian
& Redf. on Neg. 7 and 11; Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, Vol 16, p. 402 and cases
there cited. If it be inferred that the or-
dinarily prudent farmer of the community
is aware of the nature of copperas, or if ig-
norant would, under all the peculiar cir-
cumstances of this case, have ascertained
its nature beforespreading it upon the land
as a disinfectant, then the defendant in
this case failed to exercise the care that was
required of him. On the other hand, if
the ordinarily prudent farmer would have
spread the copperas as advised by the Sec-
retary of the State Board of Health, even
though he were himself ignorant of its
character, the defendant has committed no
breach of legal duty and is not liable for
the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
Either conclusion might fairly be reached
by reasonable men, and the question is
therefore one which must be submitted to
the consideration of ajury.
Although we have no doubt that our
position is the correct one, a diligent
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search of the books has failed to bring to
our support any authorities directly in
poifit. The case of Lanigan v. N. Y. Gas
Light- Co., 71 N. Y. 29, however, is of some
value. The action was for damages re-
sulting from an explosion of illuminating
gas, and the court said: "The properties
of illuminating gas in ordinary use, its
inflammable and explosive character, are
well understood, and every person of
mature years and ordinary intelligence
cannot be presumed to be ignorant of them
* * * He must be held to have known the
danger of bringing a burning lamp or a
lighted match in contact with this free
gas, and to be responsible for a disregard
of this peril." No doubt the properties of
copperas are not so commonly known as
thoseofilluminatinggas, and wehardly be-
lieve that we would be justified in decid-
ing arbitrarily that the defendafit is pre-
sumed to have been aware that copperas is
a poison and that his use of it was there-
fore negligent. However that may be, we
certainly must refuse to hold that his ig-
norance excused him from liability.
The motion for a non-suit is denied.
FARMERS BANK vs. CARLISLE
SHOE CO.
Distribution of assets of partnership-Col-
lateral securities-Liability of partner-
ship for 'money borrowed by partner.
PIPER and KENNEDY for plaintiff.
1. Partnership is responsible for the
actions of its partners when the same are
in the interest of the partnership.-Real
Est. Investment Co. v. Smith, 162 Pa. 441.
2. Money borrowed by a member of the
partnership for use of firm, the partner-
ship is liable therefore.-Dietz v. Reamer,
27Kan. 94; Heitzman v. Griffith, 43 Kan.
553.
3. Partnership is liable for money
borrowed for partnership purposes, al-
though the individual note of partners
was given to secure the debt.-Moffet v.
Leuckel, 93 Pa. 468.
BUOK and DIEHL for defendant.
Where a person or persons give no obli-
gation or assume no legal liability they are
not liable.-16 Hon. Pr. N. Y. 48.
The report of an auditor will not be set
aside except from plain mistake which the
appellant must establish by affirmative evi-
dence.-Ludlow's Estate, 13 Pa. 188; Bor-
ough's Appeal, 26 Pa. 264.
STATEBENT OF THE CASE.
The Carlisle Shoe Company was a cor-
poration doing business in Carlisle in 1895.
Desiring to borrow money, $5000, it asked
the Farmers Bank for a loan. The bank
thought the corporation insolvent, but
agreed to lend money to it, if Samuel
Smith and Warren Hughes, two parties
interested in the corporation would give
their individual note to the bank. This
was given but no obligation was given by
the company. This note was renewed
several times, the interest being paid by
Smith and Hughes each time. In 1898 the
corporation appointed a receiver. The
Farmers Bank presented its note for
$5000 before the auditor appointed to dis-
tribute the balance in the hands of the
receiver, and claimed the right to receive
a share of the assets of the company. This
the auditor refused to grant. This appeal
was therefore taken.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The principles of law applicable to this
case appear to be plain, and our only duty
is to ascertain whether or not the facts
were properly interpreted by the auditor.
Was the loan made to the Shoe Company
or to Smith and Hughes? In otherwords,
was the note of Smith and Hughes taken
by the bank in consideration of, or as col-
lateral security for the loan?
When a note is given to a bank contem-
poraneously with the creation of a debt to
the bank, the inference is that the trans-
action amounts simply to the discounting
of the note. So, in this case, if the evi-
dence merely showed that Smith and
Hughes, both of whom were interested in
the Shoe Company, went to the bank aii4
for the purpose of raising funds for the
company, gave their individual note and
received a loan of $5000, the conclusion
would be that the loan was made to them;
that the note was given as a consideration
for the loan and not as collateral security
for its payment by the Shoe Company.
And the mere circumstance that the Shoe
Company actually did receive the benefit
of the loan would not alter the conclusion.
Lindley on Partnership, 364. Such a case
would be analagous to that of Graeffv.
Hitchman, 5 Watts 454, where it was held
that money borrowed by one partner upon
his individual note is not a partnership
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debt, although afterwards applied to
partnership purposes. But the evidence
in the case before us goes very much
further. It appears that the loan was re-
quested not by Smith and Hughes, "two
parties interested in the corporation," but
by the corporation itself, and that the bank
expressly agreed to make the loan to the
corporation and not to Smith and Hughes.
These facts, we believe, rebut the presump-
tion that the note was given as considera-
tion rather than as collateral security, and
prove beyond question that credit was ex-
tended to the Shoe Company as principal
debtor.
Such being the case, the company's lia-
bility is not affected by the fact that its
name does not appear on the security.
This doctrine is said to be universal. (12
L. R. A. 223, Note.) The most familiar
illustration of its application is found in the
cases holding that if credit is extended to
a partnership, the partnership will be
liable for the debt although the individual
paper of one of the partners is taken as
collateral security. Emly v. Lye, 15 East.
7; Sifikin v. Walker, 2 Camp. 308; Weaver
v. Tapscott, 9 Leigh 424; Moffet v.
Lenekel, 93 Pa. 468; Hoeflinger v. Wells,
47 Wis. 631, and cases there cited.
The courts have recognized an excep-
tion to the general rule in cases when the
security given is in the form of a bond.
But in this State, it is held that thegiving
of a bond rather than a note raises a pre-
sumption that the debt is that of the
obligor, which can be overcome only by
the most positive evidence of an intention
to regard the bond merely as collateral
security. Bond v. Aitkin, 6 W. & S. 165;
N. Penn. Coal Co.'s Appeal, 45 Pa. 181.
The appellant, the Farmers Bank of
Carlisle, is entitled to share In the assets
of the Carlisle Shoe Company, and the ex-
ception to the auditor's report is therefore
sustained.
ANDERSON vs. MAYOR AND COUN-
CIL OF THE CITY OF WILMING-
TON.
W1ire stretched across street-Nuisance per
se-Constructive notice-Knowledge of
,olice-Questions raised are for the
J2W7.
Trespass.
MERKEL LANDIS and B. JOHNSON MAC-
EWEN for the plaintiff.
1. The wire stretched across the street
in this case was a nuisauce.-Butterfield
v. Forrester, 11 East 60; Pittston v. Hart,
89 Pa. 389; Fritch v. City of Allegheny, 91
Pa. 226;-Dean v. Milford Township, 5 W.
&S. 545.
2. The matter of custom does not enter
into the consideration of this case. No
length of time will make that legal which
is illegal. Norristnwn v. Moyer, 67 Pa.
355; Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 95 Pa. 287.
3. The municipality had constructive
notice of the obstruction. Born v. Plank
Road Co.,.12 V. N. C. 283; Farleyv. City,
11 W. N. C. 136; Borough of Nanticoke v.
Warne, 106 Pa. 373; Kebele v. City of
Philadelphia, 105 Pa. 41.
HERMAN M. SYPHERD and WAITER
TAYLOR for the defendant.
1. If the erection of this wire is the cus-
tom, it is perfectly legitimate and not a
nuisance per se. which must be abated by
the municipal authorities. Allegheny v.
Zimmerman, 95 Pa. 289.
2. Police officers appointed by acity are
not its agents or servants so as to render it
responsible for their negligent acts in the
discharge of their duties. Dillon Mun.
Cor. 2d Ed. 886; Borough of N. v. Fitz-
patrick, 94 Pa. 121; Kies v. Erie, 135 Pa.
144; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420.
3. Municipal corporations are liable only
for reasonable diligence to repair a defect
or prevent an accident after the unsafe con-
dition of any of their public works is
known. Rapho v. Moore. 68 Pa. 408;
Dewey v. Detroit, 15 Mich. 307; McCarthy
v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 198.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plaintiff was riding on one of the pub-
lic streets of the city of Wilmington on a
bicycle, when he came in contact with a
wire, which had been stretched across the
street from curb to curb, to prevent the
passage of vehicles, the object of the wire
being to prevent a sick man from being
annoyed by the passing of vehicles. A
friend of the sick man put up the wire
without consent first obtained from any
of the city authorities. This party was an
employee of the city. The chief of police
learning that the wire had been so placed,
ordered the patrolman on that district to
see that a piece of muslin was hung on the
wire during the day, and a red lantern at
night, to warn parties of the existence of
the wire. This was regularly looked after
by the patrolman. It had been the custom
of the city to thus erect wires. On the
day that Anderson ran into the wire the
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muslin had blown to one side of the street
and was wrapped around the tree to which
the wire was attached. Anderson was in-
jured and brings this suit against the city.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It is undoubtedly the duty of a municipal
corporation to properly maintain the high-
ways within its boundaries. If, by reason
of any defect or obstruction whatever, a
street becomes unsafe, the municipality
should remedy the evil without undue de-
lay, and in the meantime should adopt
suitable precautions for the protection of
travelers. And a negligent failure so to
do subjects the municipality to legal re-
sponsibility for any injury that may result.
Dean v. New Milford, 5 W. & S. 545:
Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. 226; Pittston
v. Hart, 89 Pa. 389; Trickett on Borough
Law, p. 443.
The obstruction of the street in this case
was clearly unlawful and dangerous. It is
not denied that a city, acting through its
proper officers, has the right to temporarily
interfere with traffie over a particular
street. And for certain purposes, such as
the deposit of building materials, the tap-
ping of water mains and the digging of
drains. interference by citizens may be
justifiable. But we believe that a wire
stretched across a street by a citizen with-
out the authority of the city officials, is a
nuisance per se. The fact that the
stretching of the wire in this case was sanc-
tioned by the custorui of the community
seem to us to be immaterial. It is true
that in Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 95 Pa.
287, it was held that a liberty pole erected
in the streets of Allegheny was not per se
a nuisance, because, as the court said, the
erection of liberty poles is a custom sanc-
tioned by a hundred years and interwoven
With the traditions, memories and conced-
ed rights of a free people. The case at bar,
however, is readily distinguishable. The
liberty pole was erected at a distance of
only four feet from the curb of astreet six-
ty feet in width, and consequently inter-
fered with travel to only a slight degree.
Whether or not, in view of its position in
the street and of the sanction ofrecogilized
custom, it constituted an unreasonable ob-
struction, was an eminently proper ques-
tion for the jury. In the case before us,
the obstruction was such as to completely
close the street, and moreover, being of
such a character as to be barely visible in
the daytime and absolutely invisible at
night, it was peculiarly aangerous to
passersby. Although erected with a laud-
able purpose and in accordance witli local
custom, we are of the opinion that it must
be regarded as a nuisance per se.
It follows that it became the duty of the
city, either to have the wire removed, or
if deemed advisable by the proper officers,
to adopt the act of the citizen by ordering
that it bepermitted to remain, in which
case the city was bound to provide pxoper
signals to warn approaching travelers of it
existence and location. The city was not
chargeable with this duty. however, until-
it had received notice, actual or construc-
tive, of the existence of the obstacle.-
Trickett on Borough Law, p. 449; Borough
of Birmingham v. Dover. 3 Brewst. 69;
Nanticoke Borough v Warne, 106 Pa. 373;
Brookvifle Borough v. Antrim, 130 Pa.
501. The existence of the obstruction was
known to the Chief of Police and a patrol-
man. It does not appear that it was
brought to the attention of any other pub-
lic officer. Cases are not uncommon which
hold that notice to a, policeman of an ob-
struction or defect in a city street is notice
to the city. Denver v. Deane, 10 Colo.
37.5; Rehberg v. New York, 91 N.Y. 137;
Goodfellow v. New York, 100 N. Y. 15.
But in these cases, it appears that a duty
to remove obstructions or to report them
to the proper officials, was imposed upon
policemen by statute or municipal ordi-
nance. Np municipal ordinance of the
City of Wilmington has been called to our
attention, and the statute of this state
which prescribes the duties of policemen
of cities of the third class, contains no such
provisiop. Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 277,
Art. VII 5. Since then it does not seem
to be a statutory duty of police officers to
remove obstructions from the streets or to
report them to the proper authorities; we
doubt that notice to a policeman of an ob-
struction can be regarded as notice to the
city. The chief of police stands in the
same position, in this respect, as a patrol-
man. He is by statute a member of the
force, and the difference is merely one of
rank. In Dundas v. City of Lansing, 75
Mich. 499, the court said : "The individ-
ual knowledge of officers or agents of a
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municipal corporation who in such capa-
city have powers or duties conferred upon
them with reference to a given matter, is
the knowledge of the corporation." If,
then, policemen have no powers or duties
conferred upon them with reference to the
care of streets, the knowledge of a police-
man in such a matter is not the knowledge
of the corporation. This contention is in
some measure supported by Cook v.
Anamna, 66 Iowa 427, where it is held
that notice of a defect in a sidewalk com-
inunicated to a city marshall is not such
notice as will render the city liable for an
injury resulting therefromh.
Conccding that the city did not receive
actual notice of the obstruction, is it not
ciargeable with constructive notice? The
evidence does not show precisely how long
the street had been obstructed before the
injury tothe plaintiff. We are merely told
that the display of warning signals was
"regularly looked after" by the patrolman.
The plain inference would seem to be that
it continued in position for several days.
Certainly the injury to the plaintiff did not
occur so soon after the stretching of the
wire as to justify us in holding as amatte'
of law that the city had not received con-
structive notice of the existence of the ob-
struction. On the other hand, the evidence
does notpermit us to presume conclusively
that knowledge of the obstruction had been
brought home to the city. The question is
clearly one that should be determined by
a jury, under the instruction of the court.
Bradford v. Downs, 126 Pa. 622; Man-
chester v. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118; Klein v.
Dallas, 8 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 90; Am. and
Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 9 p. 406, and cases
there cited.
If thejury shall determine that the city
is not chargeable with notice of the ob-
struction, the verdict will of course be for
the defendant. If they shall find that the
city is chargeable with notice, it will be
their further duty to determine whether
or not the city exercised reasonable care
and prudence in the performance of its
duty to protect travelers from injury. Since
these questions are so clearly Within
the province of the jury, the request to di-
rect a verdict for the defendant, must be
denied.
RICHARDS vs. SCHOOL DIRECTORS
OF THE BOROUGH OF CARLISLE.
Powers of public school directors- When
writ of mandamus will lie.
Petition for writ of mandamus.
MISS MARVEr, and SEBRING for plaintiff.
1. The powers and duties of public
school directors are regulated wholly by
statute, and they have no other powers
than those granted.- Harris. v. School
District No. 10, 28 N. H. 61; A. & E.
Ency. of Law, Vol. 21, p. 8,16.
2. No other remedy than mandamus,
for there is no statutory provision making
school directors liable for misfeasance in
office, and the municipality for similar
reason cannot be held to answer in dam-
ages.-Pepper & Lewis Digest, p. 2857;
MeManus v. School Directors, 7 Phila. 2q;
Brown v. School Directors, 10 Phila. 490.
3. Mandamus will lie to compel a Board
of Education to reinstate a pupil in public
school.-A. & E. Ency. of Law, 772.
LENTZ and MITCHEL for defendant.
1. Mandamus will not lie to control a
discretion vested in a public board.-2 P.
& W. 517, Commonwealth against Mitch-
ell et al.
2. Mandamus will not lie to control tlhe
discretion of an official in the exercise of
his judicial powers.-82 Pa. 349, Common-
wealth ex rel Snyder et al v. Mitchell
et al.
3. Mandamus does not lie where relator
has another statutory remedy.-6 Phila.
498, Commonwealth ex rel v. Clark et al.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff, John Richards, asks for a
writ of mandamus to compel the school
directors of the borough of Carlisle to re-
instate his son, Harry Richards, in the
public schools of the said borough.
It appears that Harry Richards had been
guilty of no violation of the rules when
suspended. The father, John Richards,
had gone to the school in which his son was
a pupil on Dec. 1st, 1898, and in the pres-
ence of the pupils had criticised the teach-
er's conduct in whipping his son severely,
and further complained in regard to the
methods employed by the teacher.
This was reported to the board of direc-
tors, who thereupon dismissed the boy.
The father now endeavors to compel the
board to take him back.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The education of the youth is a chief
concern of the state. To this end millions
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are annually contributed from its treasury
to the support of the common schools, and
power is given to supplement this by tax-
ation so that they may be kept open so
long as ten months of the year. Besides
attendance is made compulsory between
certain ages. It would seem manifest
therefore that only for the gravest reasons
should a pupil be excluded, and surely this
would be so where there is no fault on the
part of the pupil himself, as in the case be-
fore us.
While it is true and was long ago de-
clared that the "iniquities of the parents
are visited upon their children" yet courts
will not punish the offspring for the unwise
or even blameable conduct of those who
control them.
As the legislature has made it a penal
offense for the custodian of a child not to
enforce its attendance at the schools, it
would seem incongruous to hold that by
the foolish, ill-tempered or abusive remarks
of the former to a teacher, the right of the
latter to the benefits of the same may be
denied. It. is the people and the common-
wealth who are injured by the failure of
the latter to secure an education rather
than the parent. Indeed in Massa-
chusetts it was judicially held until other-
wise provided by statute, that "the father
was not the injured party when the child
was expelled."
Besides the law establishing the common
school system of Pennsylvania only pro-
vides for the expulsion of pupils by the
directors for "refractory or incorrigibly bad
conduct, on full examination and hearing."
It is for the misconduct of the pupil that
authority is given to expel, and it cannot
be fairly implied that such power is given
when the teacher suffers verbal abuse from
an inconsiderate parent.
This view of the law as to the powers of
school directors may not seem to be in ac-
cord with some reported cases, but we
think that an examination of the statutes
on which they are based will show that
more unrestricted power-s are given by
them to such officials.
Mandamus is the only remedy which
can be resorted to in such case, as the legis-
lature has provided no other.
The respondents must restore Harry
Richards to the school, and they are so
ordered.
COMMONWEALTH OF PA. ex. rel.
JOSEPH WILLIAMS vs. S. E. HAR-
RIS, SHERIFF.
Power of judge to suspend sentence-when
Hapeas Corpus may issue.
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
VALENTINE and BoLTE for plaintiff.
1. Court has no power to suspend
sentence indefinitely.-A. &E. E. of Law,
Vol. 21, p. 1083; U. S. v. Wilson. 46 Fed.
Rep. 748; Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 295;
People v. Rielly, 53 Mich. 260; People v.
Brown, 54 Mich. 15.
2. Such suspension amounts to Qua-i
Pardon and subsequent sentence is void.-
U. S. v. Wilson, 46 Fed. Rep. 748.
ROTHERMEL and SLOAN for defendant.
1. After conviction judge may suspend
sentence, in proper cases, either absolutely
or temporarily and discharge .prisoner.-
People v. Brown, 5 Crim. Law, M. & R.
878; People v. Mueller, 4 Crim. Law M. &
R. 725; People v. Kennedy, 58 Mich. 373.
2. Habeas Corpus act itself exempts
those persons convicted or on execution
by legal process.-Ex parte Parks, 93 U.
S. 18.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
In February, 1895, the defendant Joseph
Williams was indicted for robbery, and
plead guilty to the same. The court in-
definitely suspended sentence, and lie was
allowed to depart from the court, without
recognizance, "to again appear for sentence
or for any other purpose when so ordered."
At the February sessions of 198 the district
attorney recalled the case, ordered the
prisoner to appear, which he did, and he
was thereupon sentenced to three years
imprisonment in jail.
The defendant Williams, now presents a
petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus
to obtain his discharge from the custody
of the sheriff of the county.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
No request was made by the prisoner
or his counsel that sentence should be sus-
pended. There was no appeal or motion
in arrest of judgment or application for a
new trial. There were no circumstances
apparent which required or justified it.
The suspension of the sentence was indef-
inite as to duration. While the court had
the undoubted power to do so yet it could
only exercise that power in accordance
with the procedure which has been long
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settled, and which has due regard for the
rights of the defendant.
When the plea of guilty was entered the
relator had the right to expect that, sen-
tence would be passed upon him within a
reasonable time. If this was not done he
could conclude that the Commonwealth
had abandoned any right to inflict punish-
ment and after the delay of three years
could insist that it haol done so. Justice
Campbell in People v. Rielly, 53 Mich., 260
declared it to be his opinion that the sus-
pension of a sentence for even nine months
was such an unreasonable length of time
that the Court by the delay lost all power
to sentence the prisoner.
The relator must therefore be discharged
from custody.
CARLISLE WATER COMPANY vs.
BOROUGH OF CARLISLE.
Interest of judge necessary to disqualify
him for presiding at trial.
Petition for change of venue.
HOLcomB and SHELLENBERGER forplaintiff.
1. Act IX, Section 1 State Constitu'
tion. The declaration ol rights is against
the principle that a judge can sit in his
own case.
2. Right to change of venue.-43 Wis.
406, Carpenter and another vs. Shepard-
son; 47 Wis. 435, Bachman v. City of Mil-
waukee; 32 Wis 249, Montgomery v. the
Town of Scott.
• . Judge Baird acknowledged it as his
duty not to preside on account of his hav-
ing an interest in the case.-14 Serg &
Rawles, 405; Barrington and others v.
Bank of Washington.
O'KEEFE and JOHNSTON for defendant.
1. The liability or pecuniary gain or re-
lief to thejudge must occur upon the event
of the suit, not result remolely from the
general operation of laws and government
upon the statues fixed by the decision. -
A. & E. E. of Law, Vol. 12, p. 46; 11 Met.
390, Inhabitants of Northampton and
others v. Samuel Smith and others.
2. Taxpayers may sit s judge or jury-
men in case pending for damages against
their borough, 5 Mass. 90, Com. v. Ryan;
Am. State Rep. 121-192.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The Borough of Carlisle entered an
agreement with the Carlisle Water Com-
pany agreeing to purchase $50,000 of the
bonds of that corporation if it should con-
struct works in that borough. Certain
rights as to representation in the board of
directors were to be accorded to the borough
by members appointed by the council.
After the works were constructed the
Borough declined to take the bonds, claim-
ing that it did not have the money, and it
could not pay for the same without in-
creasing its bonded indehtedness.
This action was brought to enforce the
contract and is balled for trial before the
judge of the court, Robert Willis.
The plaintiff now presents a motion for
change of venue on the ground that the
judge is disqualified from presiding, he
being the owner of real estate in the bor-
ough, which is taxable for the borough's
bonded indebtedness.
OPINION OF COURT.
The question in this case is whether a
judge who is a resident and taxpayer of a
borough has such a, pecuniary interest in
the result of actions brought against it as
to disqualify him from sitting on the trial
of the same.
We have no act of Assembly declaring
that he is disqualified for such a reason.
Judges try causes without question when
cities, boroughs and counties of the com-
monwealth are parties plaintiff and de-
fendant, being at the same time owners of
property liable to taxation. Such has
been the case since the state was organ-
ized.
It is no ground for the challenge of a
juror in an action brought against the
county or even borough or township in
which he resides, that he happens to be a
citizen and owner of real and personal
property situated therein. While judges
and jurors are pecuniarily interested in the
result, yet the interest is so remote, that it
is not supposed that their conclusions will
be influenced thereby. "To disqualify it
must bedireetand immediate." 12Am. &
Eng. Enc. of Law 48.
The motion is therefore denied.
BOROUGH OF NEWVILLE vs.
CHRIST DAVIS.
Legality of ordinance exempting Mfer-
chants of borough- Violation of ordi-
nance.
Assumpsit.
TAYLOR and LIGHT for plaintiff.
THE FORUI.
1. Ordinance by Borofigh of Newville, re-
quiring license to canvass is constitutional,
143 Pa. 642. City of Titusville vs. Brennan,
117 Penn- 207; Borough of Warren vs. L.
F. Greer.
2. Act of April 3, 1851, requires all can-
vassers to have a license. Commonwealth
vs. Win. Gardner et at, 133 Pa. 284.
CONNLY and KERN for defendant.
1. Ordinance is invalid because discrim-
inatingin favor of merchants. Trickett on
Bbrough Law 56. Sayer Boro. vs. Phillips
148 Pa. 482; Comm. vs. Eichinbury, 140 Pa.
158.
2. Ordinance is illegal because discrimi-
nating in favor of persons residing in
Cumberland county selling farm prodlce.
City of Titusville vs. Brennan, 153 U. S.
289. Trickett on Boro. Law 159.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is an action brought by the borough
of Newville to recover the sum of $5.00
for violation of an ordinance requiring a
license to be taken out by every person
canvassing for the sale of goods, books,
etc., in the Borough of Newville. The
ordinance excepts from its provisions all
persons selling by sample to mnufactdrers
or to licensed merchants, all dealers re-
siding or doing business in the borough,
who pay a mercantile license, and all per-
sons residing in Cumberland county selling
their own farm produce. Christ Davis is
an agent of a large firm in Philadelphia.
He went to the borough with a sample
which he carried from door to door solicit-
ing orders.
It is claimed by the defendants that the
ordinanee is illegal since it is a discrimi-
nation in favor of the merchants of the
borough.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The municipalities of this common-
wealth under the police powers conferred
upon them have the power to enact ordi-
nances providing for the payment of a
license fee by those who peddle goods
within their limits. But these ordinances
in order to be valid must be impartial.
They will not be enforced by the courts if
certain persons or classes of persons are
exempted from their provisions. They
then become trade regulations which are
not within the power of the city or borough
to enact. The ordinance under consider-
ation is not unlike that which wa4 before
the court in Warren Borough v. Geer, 117
Pa. 207. But that case has been so quali-
fled and interpreted by later determina-
tions of our Supreme Cout t that it cannot
be treated as controlling or even as a guide
in passing upon the present contention.
The fact that "all dealers residing or doing
business in the borough of Newville who
'pay a mercantile license" are exempted
from paying the license fee is such a dis-
crimination as to render it void. Com. v.
Zacharias, 181 Pa. 131.




Right of labor organizations to restrict
labor of membes-Legality of contract
made by members of organization.
Assumpsit.
SHREVE and MYERS for plaintiffi
1. An association has power to make
by-laws not illegal and to attach a penalty
to the breaking of them and maintain an
action for its recovery.-A &. E. E. of
Law, Vol. 26, p. 527; Master Stevedores'
Asso. v. Walsh, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 1.
By-laws of corporate or non-corporate
bodies have the effect of a contract be-
tween members -Karcher v. Knights of
Honor, 137 Mass. 368.
3. The by-laws and regulations of vol-
untary associations command the obedi-
ence and submission of those upon whom
they are designed to act, when members
yield assent or concurrence.-Austin v.
Searing, 16 N. Y. 112.
LENTZ and LAVENS for defendant.
1. Contract is illegal, being in restraint
of trade.-Nester et at v. Continental
Brewing Co., et al, 161 Pa. 472; More v.
Bennett, 140 I1. 69.
2. Wheir liability is incurred in pursu-
ance of an illegal contract, the court will
refuse to recognize the claims of either
party. Nester v. Continntal Brewing Co.,
et at, 161 Pa. 473; Morris Run Coal Co. v.
Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 180.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
All of the carpenters in the Borough of
Carlisleentered into an agreement in which
it was stipulated that they should form a
protective association, that none should
work for less than the amount to be fixed
annuallyby themembersof the association,
and that if any of the parties of this agree-
ment should work for less than the mini-
mum amount named, he should forfeit to
the association the sum of $500. The associa-
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tiom at its meeting in January raised the
price of wages. The defendant was one of
four members who voted against the in-
creased price. Soon after he did work for
a sum less than fixed by the association
in violation of the agreement by which all
were to be bound by the decision of the
majority, and the association brings this
act ion to recover the sum of $500, which
dmage they show to have been suffered.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The passage of the acts of 1869, 1872,
1889 and 1891 not only legalizes associations
,,f laborers for their mutual benefit and pro-
tection, but authorizes them "to establish
a II necessary by-laws, rules and regulations
to carry out the same," and to refuse to
work or labor for any one when contrary
to the same, but their incorporation is
provided for.
What was criminal at common law and
declared to be such in Pennsylvania by
.) ustice Gibson three-quarters of a century
ago, is now recognized as lawful and
praiseworthy conduct.
Laborers may co-operate to maintain or
advance the rate of wages. Theirassocia-
tions may make by-laws and provide for
t he infliction of penalties for their violation.
While the forfeiture provided for in the
present case may seem excessive, yet it
must be remembered that the association
appears to have been a voluntary one and
not incorporated. The members had the
power to make such rules as they deemed
most likely to promote the welfare of them-
selves. "The court has no power to de-
clard these rules and regulations unreason-
able. It may only determine whether they
have been adopted in the way in which it
has been agreed upon by the members."
The defendant violated his agreement
and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
damages suffered, to wit, $500.
VM. MEANS vs. SAMUEL SAMPLE.
A Ca. Sa. may issue in cases of trespass on
land-Fi. ba. moy besued out at the
same time- Only one off them can be ex-
eculed-Plaintiff must elect on which he
will proceed.
Rule to show cause.
A. M. DEVALL and F. J. LAUBENSTEIN
for the plaintiff.
1. Both writs may issue at the same
time.-Act of June 15, 1836, P. L. 755, .27;
Winder v. Smith, 6 W. & S. 427.
2. If the defendant has been legally
discarged from imprisonment upon the
ca. s.,by reason of the benefit of the in
solvent laws, there is no reason for setting
aside the alias writ offi. fa.-Act of June
16, 1836, P. L. 7.55, 31.
FRANK B. SELLERS and F. D. OILER
for the defendant.
1. A ca. sa., may issue to enforce the
collection of a judgment recovered in an
action ex delicto.-Dungan v. Read, 167
Pa. 393; Romberger v. Henry, 167 Pa. 314.
2. If the defendant be arrested upon a
ca. sa., and give bond, asubsequentfi. fa.,
before his discharge in insolvency, is
irregula- and will be set aside.-Brewster's
Practice, Vol. II ?3248; Young v. Taylor,
2 Brinn 218; Davis v. Sommers, 1 T. 397;
Bank of Pa. v. Latshaw, 9 S. & R. 9;
Sharpe v. Specknagle, 3 S. & R. 463-465.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Villiam Means recovered a judgment
against Samuel Sample for $100, in an ac-
tion of trespass quare clausum fregit, on
the 5th day of May, 1898, and on August 1st,
1898, caused to be issued a writ of fieri
facias, and at the same time a writ of capias
ad satisfaciendun, against Sample, upon
the judgment, both the writs being made
returnable to the first day of the next term
of Court, viz: the 5th day of S&ptember.
Both writs were placed in the hands of the
sheriff at the same time, without any
specific directions from the plaintiff to the
sheriff as to the execution of them.
The sheriff went to the premises occupied
by the defendant, and all personal property
thereon being claimed by the defendant's
wife, made no levy on the personalty, nor
did he levy on any real estate. On the
writ of ca. sa., the sheriff took the defend-
ant into custody and brought his body
before the Court at the return day. The
defendant immediately presented his peti-
tion to the Court for leave to file his bond
as an insolvent debtorand for his discharge
from imprisonment upon the filing of the
same with surety to be approved by the
Court. The bond approved by the Court
was filed and Sample was discharged from
imprisonment, and Monday, Dec. 5th, 1898,
at 1.30 o'clock P. m. was fixed by the Court
as the time for defendant's presenting his
petition for final discharge. The Sheriff to
the writ off!. fa. made the following re-
turn:-Sheriff Returns,-' Nulla .Bona."
THE FORUM.
To the writ of ca. sa. the sheriff made
the following return:- Sheriff Returns,
-"Cpi Corpus, and defendant di.charged
from custody by order of the Court."
On the 1st day of November, 1898, the
plaintiff caused to be issued on the afore-
said judgment, an alias writ offi. fa., and
caused to be levied upon thereunder cer-
tain lands which he claims belong to the
defendant.
An inquisition was held by the sheriff
upon the lands levied, and the same were
condemned. Thereupon, on Dec. 5, 1898,
at 1.30 p. in., the defendant presented his
petition to the court setting forth the is-
suing of the former writ of ft. fa. and the
writ of ca. sa. by the plaintiff, and the re-
turns thereto by the sheriff-also setting
forth the fact of the discharge of the de-
fendant under the decree of the court, and
of the time fixed for presenting his petition
for final discharge, and praying the court
to stay and set aside the said alias writ of
ft. fa. The court thereupon granted this
rule on the plaintiff to appear and show
cause why the said writ offi. fa. should
not be stayed and set aside, returnable to
the next Argument Court.
Immediately before presenting the afore-
said petition for staying and setting aside
the alias writ of ft. fa., the defendant pre-
sented his second petition for final dis-
charge as an insolvent debtor, whereupon
the court made a decree discharging him
finally and absolutely according to the
prayer of the petition.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The judgment was recovered in an ac-
tion of trespass quare clausumfrefit. The
act of July 12th, 1842, 1 P. & L. 2317, pro-
hibiting the arrest or imprisonment of
persons in suits for money founded on con-
tract, allowed the right to issue a capias
ad satisfaciendum in cases of trespass upon
lands, to remain; Hopkinson v. Cooper, 8
Phila. 8. Cf. Romberger v. Henry, 167
Pa. 314; Dungan v. Reed, 167 Pa. 393.
Nor did the issue of theft. fa. at the
same time, makeinvalid the ca. sa. These
two writs may be sued out at the same
time, but only one of them can be exe-
cuted. 8 Ency. P1. & Pr. 635; Winder v.
Smith, 6 W. & S. 424; Young v. Taylor, 2
Binn. 218. Indeed the 27th see. of the act
of June 16th, 1836, 1 P. & L. 1918, ex-
pressly declares that "the plaintiff in any
such judgment may have at the same
time thereon, a writ of firifacias or a writ
of capias ad satisfaciendum to levy the
same, together with the costs of such ex-
ecution."
Had the sheriff proceeded to execute
both tle writs, the court would, at the
instance of Sample, have required Means
to elect on which he would proceed. He
would have levied on the personalty, had
he found any. He found none belonging,
as he believed, to Sample. He therefore
levied on none. Nor did he levy on any
land. -Nothing was done therefore to
compel the sheriff to desist from executing
the ca. sa.
The 28th section of the Act of June 16;
1836, 1 P. & L. 1920 prohibits not the issue,
but the executing of a ca. sa. when the de-
fendant has, within the county, real or
personal estate enough to pay any portion
of the judgment, until such estate shall be
sold. Nothing shows that at the time of
the arrest of the defendant, he had any
property in the county. The sheriff re-
turned "nulla bona" to the ft. fa. It
was on or after Nov. 1, 1898, that, on the
aliasf. fa., a levy was made on land which
Af eans alleges to be the property of Sam-
ple. Whether it was in fact his, or, if so,
when it became his, we do not know. So
far as appears, the ca. sa was properly
executed by the arrest of Sample. Indeed,
neither party is disputing the legality of
his arrest. Means caused it, and could not,
if he would, dispute it. Youngv. Taylor,
2 Binn. 218. Sample instead of asking the
court to discharge him on habeas corpus,
or to set aside the act of the sheriff, in
arresting him, assumed that he was legally
in durance, and proceeded under the insol-
vent law to obtain his discharge. It is now
too late for him -to deny the legality of his
arrest. Winder v. Smith, 6 W. & S. 424.
Nor does the present controversy concern
the regularity of the proceedings on the
ca. sa. The question before us is as to the
alias fi. fa.
If the debt had become extinct, before
that writissued, i~should beset aside. The
arrest of a man on a ca, sa. was held to
put an end to the debt, if he was discharged
by the consent of the plaintiff. 2 Tidd,
Practice, 1030; 8 Encyc. Pl. & Pr.. 641;
Bamford v. Keefer, 68 Pa. 389. When the
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discharge is procured by the debtor's ap-
peal to the insolvent law, the debt and the
executions not involving impiisonment,
continue. Sharpe v. Specknegle, 3 S. &
R. 462; Sect. 31, Act of June 16, 1836, 1 P.
& L. 1920. The alias ft. fa. if irregular,
is so not because of the extinction of the
judgment by the proceedings upon the ca.
.a.
The defendant contends that while it
would not have been improper to issue it
after "the final discharge of Sample, on
D c. 5, 1898, the issue of it between the ar-
rest and that discharge, was unlawful.
The Act of June 16, 1836, contemplates a
provisional and a final discharge of an im-
prisoned insolvent. He may give a bond
conditioned for his petitioning the court at
the next term for a discharge, and the
court thereupon orders him to be set at
large. Sect. 5, Act June 16, 1836. If he
fails to thus petition the court, or to obtain
his final discharge, he may be re-arrested
under the original ca. sa. If hepetitions,
and complies with the requirements of the
law, he obtains a final discharge, by the
order of the court that he '"shall not at any
time thereafter, be liable to imprisonment
by reason of any judgment or decree ob-
tained for the payment of money only."
Sect. 15, Act June 16, 1836, 1 P. & L. 2323.
After Sample's provisional discharge on
giving bond, but before his final discharge,
tei ajias fi. fa. was issued. An execution
must have been normally issuable at the
time of its issue, or it will be set aside even
when. were it to issue at the time of the
a pplication to set it aside, it would be regu-
lar. The alias ft. fa. might have been
lawfully issued after the final discharge,
but, if it was not properly issued because
that discharge had not yet taken place,
the later supervention of that discharge
does not validate it. The power of the ca.
sa. is not ended by the preliminary dis-
charge. The debtor is subject to another
arrest, under it, or under an alias writ, if
he fails to comply with the conditions of
his bond. In Young v. Taylor, 2 Binn,
218, the defendant, after being discharged
on giving bond, failed to petition the court
for his ultimate discharge. A year after-
wards,, the plaintiff, instead of causing his
re-arrest, issued a ft. fa. Subsequently,
an alias ca. sa. was also issued on which
fresh proceedings in insolvency resulted
in a discharge. The court set aside the ft.
fa., Yeates, J., remarking "It is sufficient
for us to decide, that upon inspection
of our records as they now appear, the
alias ca. sa. being a continuance of the
original ca. sa., theft. fa. was irregularly
issued, and, on the motion of Taylor (de-
fendant) would then (at the time of issue
nine years before) have been set aside and
necessarily must now le set aside." 2
Binn, 231. In Davis v. Sommer, 1 Miles,
397, the district court of Philadelphia set
aside a ft..fa. which was issued between
the provisional and the final discharge of
the insolvent defendant.
It would have been perhaps. reasonable
to regard the final discharge, if it followed,
as relating back to the preliminary dis-
charge, so as to make intervening execu-
tions valid or void, according to the
final result of the insolvency proceedings.
We think the rule has been settled other-
wise, and iolding that (as the defendant
may be re-arrested, in virtue of the origi-
nal ca. .a., on his failure to conform to the
condition of the bond, ashe is still under the
power of that ca. sa., until discharge, and
as no other execution can issue, pending
the execution of a ca. sa.,) the aliasfi. fa.,
could not lawfully issue when it did, we
must make the rule absolute.
CHARLES KUNTZ vs. GEORGE
THOMPSON.
Action in assumpsit-Liability of a drawer
of a check when the indorsement is
forged-Check not payment of a debt-
1Tot ncgligent to hand a check of the
agent of another.
W. S. STAUPER and W. L. SHIPMAN
for plaintiffi
A receipt is but primafacia evidence of
payment.-Andrews v. Koppenheafer, 3
S. & R. 355; Bell v. Bell, 12Pa. 235; Harris
v. Hay, 111 Pa. 562.
The crime of forging makes the check
void.-McHugh v. Co. of Schuylkill, 67
Pa. 391; Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447.
Kuntz cannot be responsible for the act
of his check.-Smith's Master and Ser-
vant, p. 306.
H. Al. HARPEL and JASPER ALEXAN-
DER for the defendant.
Where a debtor gives his creditor a check
to pay his debt, creditors mustuse due dil-
igence in reference to his obligation and if
loss occurs it must be borne by the debtor
by reason of his negligence.-Ellengerger
v. Insurance Co., 89 P. 464; Kilpatrick v.
Association, 119 Pa. 30.
The bank is liable for this action and
not the defendant.-Southern Nat. Bank
v. Cook, 73 Pa. 482; Bank of Rep. Millard,
10 Wall. 152.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Charles Kuntz is a dealer in leather in
Columbia. He sold $500.00 worth of goods
to the defendant in Carlisle, who sent a
check for the same to the plaintiff. A
clerk of the plaintiff received the check
and sent a receipt for the same to Thomp-
son, signed with a stamp which was sup-
plied by the plaintiff for the purpose. The
clerk was dishonest, which Kuntz might
have known by the exercise of due care.
He forged the name of his employer on the
check, had it cashed, and appropriated
the proceeds to his own use. The check
after passing through several banks ar-
rived at Carlisle and was paid by Thomp-
son. Subsequently two other purchases
were made by the defendant and paid for.
After these'transactions the plaintiff dis-
covered that the first bill of $500.00 was
not paid. He brings this action to recover
that sum from the defendant.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.
G0c'tlemen of the Jury:
Had the check, sent by Thompson to
Kunt7, been received by the latter as pay-
mient, we discover nothing ifi the facts
developed at the trial, to allow him to have
recourse to the original contract. Hisonly
remedy would be upon the check. The
check was genuine, and the payment of it
by the bank upon a forged endorsement of
it, can hardly be regarded as a violation of
a tacit condition on which the check was
received as payment of the bill.
But, there is no presumption that a
check is taken as payment, unless and
until it is actually paid. The drawer of it
may order the drawee not to pay it. The
receipt sent to Thompson was not a receipt
of payment of the bill, but "for" the
check. We doubt not that Kuntz may
recur to the original transaction, failing to
obtain payment of the check. Shephard
& M. Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, 41 L. R. A.
617.
Kuntz could not sue on the check, had he
recovered it from Thompson after its sur-
render to him by the bank. While there
is privity between the depository bank
and the depositor, there is none between
the former and the payee named in the
checks of the latter. First National Bank
of Washington v. Whitman, 94 1. S. 343;
First Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94.
When the bank has accepted the check,
it may be sueq by its holder, Saylor v.
Busbong; 100 Pa. 23; Seventh Nat. Bank,
v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483; and, perhaps in Penn-
sylvania, 73 Pa. 483, though not ih the
United States, 94 U. S. 343, the payment
of a check to a stranger would be such an
acceptance of it as would support an
action on it by the owner of it, if the
amount did not exceed $20. The Act of
May 10, 1881, may prevent such acts being
regarded equivalent to acceptance, when
the check exceeds $20. Maginn v. Dollar
Savings Bank, 131 Pa. 362.
Kuntz could doubtless sue his clerk who
obtained the money, but such suit would
be useless. Can he, under the circum-
stances, sue Thompson? We think the
answer to this question depends on the
answer to the question whether Thompson
can recover from the bank. He had $500
on deposit there. He authorized the bank
to pay out that sum to Kuntz, or to Kuntz's
endorsee. The bank has paid it out, but
neither to Kuntz nor to his endorsee. If the
bank is to be permitted to defend itself
against Thompson, when he demands from
it his $500, it would be inequitable to
compel him to pay another $500 to Kuntz.
The bank has paid out his money with-
out authority. It has not paid Kuntz. It
has paid one who forged his name. It
must therefore repay to Thompson the
amount of his deposit. West Phila. Rank
v. Green, 3 Penny. 456 Indeed, if its-act
of paying the check to the clerk could be
treated as an acceptance of the check, it
could be compelled to pay it again to Kuntz
the payee. Seventh Nat. Bank v. Cook,
73 Pa. 23. For this reason, the bank in
turn, can recover- from the clerk what it
paid him. Chambers v. Union National
Bank, 78 Pa. 205.
The only serious obstacle to a recovery
by the plaintiff, that has been urged, is,
that as he has by his negligence per-
mitted the bank to be imposed on by a
fraudulent endorsement, it would not be
equitable to allow him to recover from the
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depositor, who, in turn might then recover
from the bank. It surely was not neg-
ligence to have in Kuntz's employ a
clerk who in fact committed the forgery.
In 73 Pa. 21, supra, the endorsement was
forged by a clerk, but the bank was com-
pelled to pay the amount a second time.
If Kuntz had been ordinarily suspicious
and circumspect, he would have discover-
ed that his clerk was dishonest. He was
not thus suspicious, and he did not make
the discovery. Is he then to be liable for
all the contracts which, without author-
ity, this clerk may make in his name?
For any bonds to, which he may sign
Kuhtz'.a name as obligor? For any proinis-
sory notes? He had no authority to make
contracts of any species for Kuntz, nor to
affix his name to any? Was Kuntz bound
to anticipate that he would forge hisname
to bonds, notes, checks, aud to discharge
him beforb he had done so, on pain of be-
ing answerable for such bonds, notes and
checks? We cannot think so. The clerk
has committed a crime, and the bank has
been deceived by it into dealing in an
unauthorized way with the deposit of
Thompson. We fail to see Why the conse-
quence of this deception, practiced on the
bank should be transferred from it toKuntz.
There are some cases which hold that
when the negligent act of. A, has enabled
B to seem to have A's authority to do
sonething, A will be chargeable* with the
thing done. A's act however, shouldmore
directly conduce to this appearance of B's
having authority, than Kuntz's act. Kuntz
had not given the clerk the power to
possess his checks, to endorse them, and
to deposit them. He employed that per-
-on for a very different purpose. No con-
ductof hiq had led the bank to assume
that the clerk had warrant from him to
collect the check. So far as appears, he
lid not pretend to have written the en-
dorsement of the check himself. This
case is not distinguishable from Shephard
Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, (Mass.) 41 L. R.
A. 6 7, where the conclusion reached was
similar to that which we are now indicat-
ing. Cf. also, Penna. Co. v. Franklin Fire
Ins. Co., 181 Pa. 40.
The bank had no right, as against
Thompson, to pay out this m'bney, upon the
check so endorsed by the clerk. Since
then, he has the ability to recover his de-
posit from it, and the plaintiff has not, he
must pay the plaintiff. Had the bank be-
came insolvent, a different question would
have been presented. It would then be
necessary to inquire whether any circum-
stance since the drawing and paying of
the check had transpired that would estop
Kuntz from causing a loss to rest finally on
Thompson.
Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of
the jury, should be for the plaintiff for the
sum of $500 with interest from the date of
the check.
JANE WILLIAMS' ADM. vs. AN-
DREW GREGGS' ADM.
Statute of Limitation-Attorm'y in fact-
presumption of payment.
Assumpsit.
HARRY C. HUBLER and WALTER B.
FtEED for plaintiff.
1. Upon the death of the principal,
agent is liable to account to his personal
representative. Clegg vs. Baumberger, 110
Ind. 536; Simmons vs. Simmons, 33 Gratt
451.
2. If agent dies, his personal represent-
ative must satisfy all debts of decedent. P.
& L. Digest, Vol. I. p. 1432.
3. Absence of accounts in hands of agent
authorizes the suspicion that he did not
use the money according to the wishes of
his principal. Burden of proof ison agent.
Clark vs. Tipping, 9 Bear. 284; Keighler
vs. Mfg. Co., 12 Md. 383; Peterson vs.
Paignard, 8"B. M. (Ky.).309; Gibson Es-
tate,:18 Phila. 119; Young vs. Powell, 87
Mo. 128.
4. Statute of Limitations does not ap-
ply: it must begin to run from some definite
time and no definite time is stated.
GEO. V. COLES and GEO. W. AUBREY
for defeiriant.
1. Action is barred by Statute of Limi-
tations of March 27, 1713.
2. Attorney in fact may plead the
statute.-Trickett Limitations, 203; Mor-
gan v. Tener, 83 Pa. 305; Fleming v. Cul-
bert, 46 Pa. 498; Glen v. Cuttle, 2 Grant
273; Rhines v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192.
3. Right of action accrued Dec. 22,
1886.-Campbell v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524;
Glen v. Cuttle, supra; Fleming v. Cul-
bert, supra.
4. When more than six years have
elapsed the onus, to take case out of the
statute, is on the creditor,-Campbell v.
Boggs, supra; Rhines v. Evans, supra.
5. Payment may be inferred because
creditor was in financial embarassient
while the debtor died in opulence, coupled
with other corroborating circumstances.-
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Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28; Connely
v. MceKean, 64 Pa. 113; Diamond v. To-
bias, 12 Pa. 312; Whar. on Evidence, 1362.
This being a legacy is presumed to have
heen paid within one year from Dec. 22,
1886.- 51 Act of Feb. 24, 1834, P. L. 83.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
William Gregg died Aug. 12, 1881, de-
vising inter alia, the residue bf his per-
sonal estate to his two sisters, Mrs. Ann
Huggins and Mrs. Jane Williams. A. J.
Gregg, brother of said William Gregg,
paid to the executor of the estate of William
Gregg, a note of $2,200 on or about Dec.
22, 1886. Mrs. Jane Williams appointed
her brother, the said A. J. Gregg, her at-
torney-in-fact. A. J. Gregg received from
the estate of said Win. Gregg $1,100, the
share of Mrs. Jane Williams in aforesaid
note, as her attorney-in-fact. There is no
evidence by way of receipts or otherwise
that A. J. Gregg ever paid the $1,100 over
to Mrs. Jane Williams. Mrs. Jane Wil-
lianis died March 10, 1894. A. J. Gregg
died March 20, 1895. Oh June 30, 1898,
Mrs. Jane Williams' heirs filed a claim for
$1,100 against the heirs of A. J. Gregg.
Neither side seems to be able to produce
any evidence except money has been paid
to Mirs. Jane Williams since 1881; that she
was then and until her death, short of
money. That A. J. Gregg was always
very prompt in paying all accounts; and
that he died leaving an estate of $50,000
unencumbered.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
When the collection of money by an
agent is shown, there is no presumption
that the agent has accounted for-the samie
to his principal. On the contrary, the
burden rests upon the agent to show either
that such money was paid. over or other-
wise disposed of by the principal's direc-
tion. Young v. Powell, 87 Mo. 128; Car
der v. Primm, 52 Mo. App. 102. In re
Gilson's Est., 18 Phila. 119. In the case
at bar. then, the plaintiff by proving that
the $1100 in question were actually paid to
A. J. Gregg, the defendant's intestate, im-
posed upon the defendant the burden of
showing the payment over of that sum by
Gregg to Jane Williams. Of such pay-
ment. the defendant is unable to produce
any direct evidence, but he contends that
the circuinstances of the case are such as
to raise a presumption that it was made,
and thus to again shift the burden of proof
to the shoulders of the plaintiff.
The sum of $2,200 was received by the
executor of William Gregg on December
mr[r~ lh h 'VDoTT r%J E-U U ..
22, 1886. The estate had already been in
the hands of the executor for five years,
and since no deductions were made from
the $2,200, all debts of the estate must haye
been satisfied. It was therefore the plain
duty of the executor to-proceed at once to
the distribution' of the residuary estate.
He must be presumed to have performed
that duty, and it follows that the sum
of $1,100 in question must have been paid
to the attorney-in-fact of Jane Williams
within a short time after December 22,
1886, and at the latest on or before Decem-
ber 22, 1887. That being the case, more
than ten years elapsed after the receipt of
the money by A J. Gregg, before this ac-
tion was commenced. A legal lIresump-
tion of payment ordinarily arises only after
the expiration of twenty years, but it has
been held that a less period of time, in
connection with "persuasive circum-
stances," may suffice. Henderson v.
Lewis, 9 S. & R. 384; Moore v. Smith, 81
Pa. 182. The circumstances of the case
before us are strongly persuasive. The fact
that A. J. Gregg was a brother of Jane
Williams, and a man who was always
prompt in the payment of his obligations,
makes it improbable that the money was
not paid. And when in addition, it is
considered that A. J. Gregg was a man of
considerable means, leaving at his death
an unencumbered estate of $50,000, while
Jane Williams, during the seven years in-
tervening between the receipt of the money
by Gregg and her death, was in actual
need of funds, it seems almost incredible.
We are of the opinion that a presumption
of payment would be quite justifiable,
especially in view of the many cases in
this State which hold that after the death
of the parties, payment of a debt may be
presumed from the fact that at the time
of maturity, the debtor was in. opulence
and the creditor in needy circumstances.
Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Lesley
v. Nones, 9 S. & R. 410, Diamond v.
Tobias, 12 Pa. 312; Conelly v. McKean, 64
Pa. 113.
We prefer, however, to rest our decision
upon other and even clearer ground. It
has been pointed out that since we must
assume that the money came into the
hands of A. J. Gregg on or before Decem-
her 22, 1887, more than, ten years elapsed
before the commencement of the suit.
The right of action accrued upon the re-
ceipt of the money by Gregg, so that it is
now plainly barred by the operation of the
statute of limitations. (Act of March 27,
1713.)
Judgment for the defendant.
